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Abstract
In the present thesis, we analyze the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
(SPNE) of two di¤erent non-cooperative games. These games involve dynamic
bankruptcy situations where agents have linear preferences over the set of
possible allocations. We rst consider a case where there are two agents and
two periods (2 2) and, then, N agents and T periods (N  T ). For the rst
game (the Steel Game) we characterize the equilibria under the renowned CEA
rule. For the second game (the Hospital Game), we consider a more general
set of rules. Namely, we prove that a certain strategy prole is an equilibrium
under the rules that satisfy bounded impact of transfers and weak (strong)
claims monotonicity for 2 2 (N  T ) model and the payo¤s of all equilibria
are unique and equal to those of this proles.
Keywords: Dynamic Claims Problems, Bankruptcy Rules, Non-cooperative
Claims Game, Bounded Impact of Transfers, Weak (Strong) ClaimsMonotonic-
ity.
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D·INAM·IK ALACAKLAR PROBLEMLER·I ÜZER·INE ·IS¸B·IRL·IKÇ·I
OLMAYAN OYUNLAR
Ercan Aslan
Ekonomi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2010
Tez Dan¬¸sman¬: Özgür K¬br¬s
Özet
Bu tezde, iki farkl¬i¸sbirlikçi olmayan oyunun Alt-Oyun Yetkin Nash Den-
gesini analiz ettik. Bu oyunlar, ajanlar¬n olas¬paylas¸¬mlar üzerinde do¼grusal
tercihlere sahip oldu¼gu ias durumlar¬n¬kapsamaktad¬r. Öncelikle, iki ajan¬n
ve iki dönemin varoldu¼gu (2  2) durumu ele ald¬k, sonrada N ajan¬n ve T
dönemin varoldu¼gu durumu (N  T ). ·Ilk oyunumuzda (Çelik Oyunu) mes¸hur
CEA kural¬alt¬nda olus¸an dengeleri karakterize ettik. ·Ikinci oyun (Hastane
Oyunu) içinse daha genel bir oyunlar kümesini ele ald¬k. S¸öyle ki, 2  2
(N  T ) model için belli bir strateji prolinin, transferlerin s¬n¬rl¬etkisini ve
zay¬f (güçlü) alacaklar¬n tekdüzeli¼gini sa¼glayan kurallar alt¬ndaki oyunlar için
denge oldu¼gunu ve bu oyunlar için denge ödüllerinin yegane ve bu prolinkine
es¸it oldu¼gunu gösterdik.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Dinamik Alacaklar Problemleri, ·Ias Kurallar¬, ·I¸sbir-
likçi Olmayan Alacak Oyunlar¬, Transferlerin S¬n¬rl¬Etkisi, Zay¬f (Güçlü) Ala-
caklar¬n Tekdüzeli¼gi.
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1 Introduction
A claims problem is a very simple allocation problem in which there is an
endowment to be allocated among some agents, each characterized by a claim
on the endowment. In real life, many examples of this problem exist. For
instance, liquidation of a bankrupt rm among its creditors, how a state should
allocate its budget based on the needs of public institutions are often times
observed.
The rst example is the so called bankruptcy problem. Firms raise funds
from investors which can provide them with the working capital they need
for their operations and let them undertake long-term investments. We care
for them because many important ventures are impossible at the lack of these
funds. In return, they pay the creditors the principal plus some interest. Firms
depend on their cash ows to fulll this obligation. However, there are times
things go wrong and projected cash ows dont occur on time. This kind of
situation may prevent the payment of the debt. Whenever a rm is insu¢ cient
to pay its creditors, there are two possible actions. It can either reorganize or
go bankrupt. Reorganization, which is not the interest of the present thesis, is
the act that changes the ownership structure of the rm and the maturity of
the loans to let the rm stay in business and, as a result, continue to pay its
debt. On the other hand, bankruptcy is the legal diagnose and declaration of
a rms insolvency. When a rm goes bankrupt, it has a liquidation value E. E
is to be allocated among the creditors based on the amount due that must be
paid to each creditor. Therefore, each amount due is the claim of a creditor.
The problem is how to allocate this scarce value E based on the amount due
of each creditor.
The second example is the so called rationing problem. It involves a central
authority, most often some state department(Devlet Planlama Tes¸kilat¬), and
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public institutions such as hospitals or universities. These institutions need
funding from the state budget in order to nance their expenditures. The state
has a pre-determined budget at each time period. However, the total amount
an institution can demand depends on the proof of need. In this sense, the
amount each can demand is limited. Nevertheless, each can report its claim
strategically across the periods. In addition, the unpaid portion of the need
can be reclaimed. Notice that the latter example includes time dimension and
strategic choice of the claims reported. In this case, the allocation is repeated
more than once.
The literature contains several prominent solutions to these problems. Among
those, the most widely used rules are .Proportional Rule(PRO hereafter), Con-
strained Equal Awards(CEA hereafter), Constrained Equal Losses(CEL here-
after) and the Talmud Rule(TAL hereafter). As the name itself suggests, the
PRO allocates the estate proportionally to agentsclaims. For each problem,
CEA comes up with a  and o¤ers this to each agent. The agent gets this  if
it is equal to or smaller than his claim. Otherwise, he gets his claim. In other
words, CEA determines an upper bound on the payo¤s and applies this upper
bound anonymously. CEL works in a similar way. It uniquely determines a
 and subtracts this from each agentsclaim. Each agent gets the remaining
amount if it is non-negative. Otherwise, he gets zero. Finally, TAL operates
in two di¤erent ways in two di¤erent situations. If the half-sum of the claims
exceeds the endowment, it creates the same allocation as if CEA is applied to
the half-claims. Otherwise, it works in two di¤erent steps. Firstly, everybody
receives a share as much as his half-claim. Then, CEL is applied to the residual
claims. These rules are discussed in detail in the following subsection.
Mainly, there are three di¤erent approaches to claims problem. : axiomatic,
direct and game-theoretic approaches.(For a detailed discussion see Thom-
son(2003)) In the present thesis, we are interested in the game-theoretic one.
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We construct a non-cooperative game in which each agent strategically allo-
cates his claim over nite number of periods. At each period, agents move
simultaneously and the game is played under complete information.
On the other hand, the current literature mainly concentrates on the char-
acterization of the static rules. That is, the research is about some rules
uniquely satisfying some properties or satisfying di¤erent desirable combina-
tions of those. There isnt much discussion about the situations where the
same allocation problem is repeated over time.
It is reasonable to perceive these repeated problems as a single allocation
problem with time dimension if the agents subject to this problem are the same
set of agents receiving shares in each period. In such a situation, all the current
literature can do is to apply the same rule in each period. However, some
previously-not-considered problems may arise, then. In the present thesis, we
are investigating a problem of that kind. Namely, if the agents are capable
of adjusting the spread of their claims strategically, then they can manipulate
the payo¤s using this knowledge. To investigate this, we design two distinct
kinds of non-cooperative games and nd out their equilibria. We are doing the
same analysis both for the two agents-two periods case and for the arbitrary
number of agents-arbitrary number of periods case. In the rst model, the
agents allot their claims to time periods. The level of the allotted claim to
each period does not necessarily depend on other agentsclaims. That is, If
some agent i is playing a certain strategy, say strategy si; then the level of
claim he uses at each period does not change with respect to other agents
claims at those periods, i.e., with respect to othersstrategies. In addition,
at none of the periods agents can reuse the claims that they have already
used at the preceding periods, regardless of the level of the shares they have
received for those claims. There is an abundance of real life examples for such
a situation. To illustrate, an important one is the scarce steel production in
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US during WWII. In 1943, 85% of the total steel production in US was used
for war e¤ort. As a result, there was a limited supply and only a small part of
it could be used for agricultural machinery and equipment production. Most
of the time, agents had to trade in their worn-out machinery. However, in such
situations the state can give the farmers somewhat less than what they brought
in and take the whole machinery they brought for the steel needs. The details
of this example can be found in the Sears Application (1942). Referring to this
renowned example, we will call our rst game the Steel Game. In the second
model, agents choose how much they will claim in the rst period, just like
the rst one. Yet, unlike the former one, in the second period their remaining
claims are determined by subtracting the rst periods share from the total
claims available at the beginning of the game. If there is a third period, the
maximum amount that an agent can claim in that period is determined by
subtracting the rst and the second periods shares of the agent from the total
claim available at the beginning of the game and so on. Since our example
regarding this model involves partitioning of a budget to hospitals, we will
call it the Hospital Game hereafter. For the steel model, we focus on the
well-known and intuitive rule CEA. As for the hospital model, we consider
a broader class of rules including CEA. Namely, they are the rules satisfying
bounded impact of transfers and claims monotonicity. When we extend our
setting to an arbitrary number of agents and periods, we require the strong
version of claims monotonicity. Fortunately, these properties are satised by
a wide range of rules including PRO, CEA, CEL and TAL.
In both settings, our nding yield a multiplicity of equilibria but unique
payo¤s. In any equilibria of the steel game, based on the total claims of agents,
each period has a certain parameter. If the total claim of an agent exceeds the
sum of the parameters running from the rst period to the last, then he claims
at least as much as the relevant periods parameter at each period. Otherwise,
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the agent compares the parameter with his remaining claim. Then, he claims
the minimum of those two. In the equilibria of the hospital game, all agents
claim the maximum amount permitted by the remaining claims in hand at
each period. Note that these results are due to our assumption that agents
prefer the former periods to the latter ones.
1.1 Literature Review
There are very old historical examples of the claims problem. One of the earli-
est manuscripts where such a problem is addressed is the Babylonian Talmud.
In the Talmud, there are two problems of this kind considered. The rst one
is called the contested garment problem. It involves two men having a con-
ict on how to share the worth of the garment. The second is the marriage
contract problem. It involves a man and his three wives, each of which have
signed a marriage contract with him. However, there isnt a general solution
to such problems in Talmud. It only species a solution to a single problem.
That is, for a unique set of numbers indicating the claims and the endow-
ment. In the past, many scholars proposed allocation rules that generate the
numbers in the Talmud. An allocation rule takes the claims of the agents and
the endowment as input and allocates the endowment to the agents based on
the claims. It is plausible to assume that if the sum of the claims doesnt
exceed the endowment, then the rule gives everybody as much as his claim.
The one that we use as the Talmud Rule in this thesis is proposed by Au-
mann and Maschler (1985). It is widely accepted in the literature because
it is the unique rule which generates the numbers in the Talmud and at the
same time satises some nice properties. On the other hand, this does not
mean that it is the most desirable rule in each situation. For normative rea-
sons, in many di¤erent situations many di¤erent rules are used. To illustrate,
Gächter and Riedl (2006) shows us that proportional rule is considered as the
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fairest rule by most of the people. Their work supplements the literature by
empirical evidence on three di¤erent solution concepts. Since the desirable
rules proposed in the literature all rely on di¤erent properties, they claim that
the attractiveness of a rule does not only depend on the theoretical aspects
but also the actual perceived appeal by people once they face the problem in
real life. They employ a vignette technique to observe impartial participants
perception on fairness and nd out the result we mentioned above about PRO
Secondly, they design a laboratory experiment where the agents with self-
interests and claims bargain on allocation. They show that this game leads
to an allocation similar to that of CEAs. This experiment shows us that
the allocation in an equilibrium of a game might be di¤erent from normative
judgements about the same situation. In order to understand this kind of
actual behaviors, many authors designed di¤erent games. Garcia-Jurado et
al., (2006) propose a one shot game in which each agent chooses his claim.
Although claiming more generates a higher payo¤ in many contexts, since in
their setting the agents with a lower claim has a priority over the others, each
agent claims the same amount in equilibrium. Thus, the resulting allocation
is the equal division. They show that all the Nash equilibria of their game
yield the same payo¤ vector. Furthermore, one can show that in a game of
that form with n agents, the strategy prole in which all agents claim E
n
is
the unique Nash equilibrium. The game they formulate is a simple one in the
sense that its not sequential. Also, since an agent might lose priority and,
hence, decrease his share by increasing his claim, the allocations that are pro-
posed to di¤erent claims vectors by this game can not coincide with those of
a claims monotonic rule. On the contrary, we have a sequential game and we
impose claims monotonicity to the rules we use in our setting. In the seminal
paper, ONeill (1982), where the simple claims problems in the literature are
rst originated, a problem of n heirs and n corresponding wills is addressed.
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(In other words, Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezras proposal about a man who dies
leaving inconsistent wills to his sons) Similar to our work, the utilities of the
heirs are assumed to be linear with the bequests they receive. He criticizes
Ibn Ezras premises, mainly premise 2 stating that the claims of the heirs fully
overlap, and proposes and discusses alternative solutions with their pros and
cons. Still, the alternatives he proposes keep the other premises. (premise 1
and premise 3) As one of the alternatives, he also proposes a non-cooperative
game in which the four sons choose what part of the endowment they claim as
the strategy variable. He characterizes the minimal overlap rule as the Nash
equilibrium of the non-cooperative game.
Kar and K¬br¬s (2008) construct a model which involves multiple endow-
ments. In their model, however, each agent can receive share from at most one
endowment. If the preferences are single peaked and symmetric, they show
that any e¢ cient single-endowment rule can be combined by a matching rule
to construct a multi-endowment e¢ cient allocation rule. In their mechanism,
rstly the matching rule assigns agents to endowments. Then, in the second
stage, the single-endowment rationing rule applies to each endowment and its
assigned agents. In addition, they establish two impossibility results when the
domain of the single-peaked preferences is extended to asymmetric ones.
There is also a drastically growing literature on manipulation. For instance,
Thomson (1984) show that given a choice correspondence and all associated
manipulation games, any equilibrium allocation of such manipulation games
is an equilibrium allocation of the Walrasian manipulation game. In a static
bankruptcy setting, it is interesting to inquire whether a given simple claims
problem embodies manipulation. As a matter of fact Ju (2003) analyzes immu-
nity of bankruptcy rules to manipulation via splitting and merging. That work
characterizes the domain of rules that satisfy equal treatment of equals, consis-
tency, continuity and are non-manipulable via pairwise splitting and pairwise
7
merging. ( Namely, rules with superadditive and subadditive representations,
respectively) Moreno-Ternero (2007) restricts attention to TAL-family of rules
(for a detailed discussion on this family see Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006)
). For each member of the family, they identify on which problems it satis-
es either non-manipulability via merging or non-manipulability via splitting.
Moreno-Ternero (2006) provides an alternative proof to the fact that non-
manipulability and PRO imply each other in an unrestricted domain. He also
shows that this result continues to hold in some restricted domains.
K¬br¬s and K¬br¬s (2009) design a non-cooperative game so as to explain
why proportional rule is the most widely used rule in real life bankruptcy
situations. They show that the answer lies in the investment implications of the
rule. Karagözo¼glu (2008) supports PRO by means of a di¤erent investment-
bankruptcy game
2 The 2 2 Steel Game
Let N = f1; 2g be the set of agents and let Et 2 R+ be a social endowment
to be allocated among members of N . For each i 2 N , let ci 2 R+ be
agent is claim on the social endowment. Assume c1 + c2  Et: Let c =
(c1; c2) : We call (c; Et) a static claims problem. Denote the class of all
static claims problems byßSTAT : Then F :ßSTAT ! RN+ is a claims rule if for
each (c; Et) 2ßSTAT ; P
i2N
Fi (c; E
t) = Et and 0 6 F (c; Et) 6 c. In words, given
a static claims problem, F distributes the endowment among the agents.
We are interested in a framework where a group of agents have to share two
social endowments that arrive in two di¤erent periods. To model this situation,
denote the set of periods by T = f1; 2g : Let E =
"
E1
E2
#
be the vector of
endowments to be divided in periods 1 and 2, respectively. We assume that
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each agent prefers shares from period 1 endowment over period 2 endowment.
Each agent i discounts period 2 endowment with a given discount factor
i 2 (0; 1) : Suppose that  =
"
1
2
#
is the vector of discount factors of
agents. We represent the agent i0s share by xi = (x1i ; x
2
i ); where x
t
i represent
his share in period t 2 T . We assume that the utility of agent i from xi is of
the form ui = x1i + ix
2
i for i = 1; 2:
A claims problem with time preferences is a triple (c; E; ) such that
for each t 2 T; (c; Et) 2ßSTAT is a static claims problem and  is the vector
that represents agentsdiscount factors.
We next introduce a non-cooperative game where each agent strategically
decides on how to allocate his total claim ci between the two periods. To model
this, let agent is strategy set be Si = [0; ci] : A typical strategy of i is si 2 Si
and it is interpreted as the part of is claim used in period 1. Her remaining
claim ci  si is used in the second period. Given a problem (c; E; ) and a rule
F; let d = (c; E; ; F ): Agent is payo¤ from a strategy prole s = (s1; s2) is
then udi (s) = Fi(s1; s2; E
1)+ iFi(c1  s1; c2  s2; E2): Observe that we assume
that the same rule is applied in both periods.
Denition 1 A claims game with respect to d = (c; E; ; F ) is
Gd =


N;S1; S2; u
d
1; u
d
2

satises E1; E2  0;  2 [0; 1]2,
2P
i=1
ci > max fE1; E2g :
2.1 Equilibria Under The CEA Rule
Denition 2 (CEA) For each (c; Et) 2ßSTAT and each i 2 N; CEAi(c; Et) 
min

ci; 
t
	
where t satises
P
j2N
min

cj; 
t
	
= Et:
CEA advocates the idea of equal division (ED hereafter), yet respecting
the di¤erences in claims, at least in some cases. Under equal division, some
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agents might receive more than their claims. For this reason, ED is not an
allocation rule. In contrast, under CEA each agents claim is an upper bound
for his share. Accordingly, under CEA, agents will receive the same shares as
under ED as long as this amount does not exceed their claims.
Example 1 i) (c1; c2) = (7; 9) and Et = 10 implies t = 5 and CEA1(c; Et) =
5; CEA2(c; Et) = 5 and ED1(c; Et) = 5; ED2(c; Et) = 5: Both rules lead to
the same allocation and allocate the same amount to each agent ignoring the
di¤erence in claims. ii) (c1; c2) = (3; 9) and Et = 10 implies 
t = 7 and
CEA1(c; Et) = 3; CEA2(c; Et) = 7 and ED1(c; Et) = 5; ED2(c; Et) = 5: CEA
recognizes the di¤erence in claims to some extend but ED not. Furthermore,
ED awards agent 1 with a higher share than CEA.
The allocation method used by CEA can also be explained by means of an
algorithm. The algorithm works as follows:
Firstly, let everyone receive the same share, that is, start with ED. If no
agent receives more than his claim, then CEA leads to ED. Otherwise, let
the agents, who receive more than their claims, receive just as much as their
claims and allocate the resulting surplus equally among others. After that, if
no agents share exceeds his claim, then thats the allocation. Otherwise, let
the agents, who receive more than their claims, receive just as much as their
claims and rearrange the resulting surplus so that the remaining agents receive
equal shares from the surplus. Proceed this way until no one receives more
than his claim.
Remark 1 Let (c; Et) 2ßSTAT be given. Assume that c1 + c2 > Et: If the
endowment is to be distributed among the agents using CEA rule, then there
exists a unique  which satises min f; c1g+min f; c2g = Et: Note that the
previous statement remains valid if the number of agents is n > 2:
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For each s 2 S; dene 1 (s) 2 R+ as follows
1 (s)
8><>: uniquely solves
2P
i=1
min

si; 
1 (s)
	
= E1 if
PN
i=1 si > E
1
max fs1; s2g if
PN
i=1 si  E1
and 2 (s) 2 R+ as
2 (s)
8><>: uniquely solves
2P
i=1
min

si; 
2 (s)
	
= E2 if
PN
i=1 si > E
2
max fc1   s1; c2   s2g if
PN
i=1 si  E2
Consider d = (c; E; ; F ) and Gd =


N;S1; S2; u
d
1; u
d
2

where c1 + c2 > E1 +
E2: In this situation, the game will lead to multiple equilibria but a unique
payo¤ vector. This multiple equilibria will be result of redundant claims. Any
agent i 2 N with ci > E1+E22 is endowed with a level of claim more than the
amount su¢ cient to obtain the same payo¤. However, having a higher level
of claim does not lead to a better payo¤ vector. Thus, we will restrict our
attention to the case where c1 + c2  E1 + E2:
Example 2 Consider any game under CEA with c = (160; 160) and E =
(100; 100): Let 110  s1; s2  50: One can see that for each player any selection
of the strategy prole (s1; s2) constitute a Nash Equilibrium. Furthermore, the
unique payo¤ vector is (x11; x
2
1; x
1
2; x
2
2) = (50; 50; 50; 50):
Proposition 1 Let d = (c; E; ; F ) and Gd =


N;S1; S2; u
d
1; u
d
2

such that c1+
c2  E1 + E2: Then, the unique Nash Equilibrium of Gd is s dened as(
si = s

j =
E1
2
if ci; cj > E
1
2
si = E
1   cj; sj = cj if ci > E
1
2
and cj  E12 for i; j 2 N
Proof. First note that for each strategy prole s 2 S such that
2P
i=1
si <
E1, there exists i 2 N and si 2 Si such that udi (si + ; sj) > udi (si; sj)
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for some  > 0: To see this, notice that if
2P
i=1
si < E
1 then there exists
si 2 Si such that si < ci: Then, there exists  > 0 and (si + ) 2 Si
such that si +  + sj  E1: Then, CEAi (si + ; sj; E1) = si + : In addi-
tion, CEAi (ci   si; cj   sj; E2)     CEAi (ci   si   ; cj   sj; E2) : There-
fore, CEAi (si; sj; E1)+ iCEAi (ci   si; cj   sj; E2)  CEAi (si + ; sj; E1)+
iCEAi (ci   si   ; cj   sj; E2), that is, such strategy proles can not be a
Nash Equilibrium
Case 1: ci  E12 and cj  E
1
2
: Let s 2 S be such that P2i=1 si  E1:
Then, by denition, 1(s)  E1
2
: Thus, for each si 2 Si; CEAj (si; cj; E1) = cj,
That is, Agent j can receive her full claim in the rst period. Notice that
his shares from sj = cj are CEAj (si; cj; E
1) = cj in the rst period and
CEAj (ci   si; 0; E2) = 0 in the second. Let s0j = cj    for some  2 (0; cj] :
Then, his shares from s0j are CEAj (si; cj   ; E1) = cj  in the rst period and
CEAj (ci   si; ; E2)   in the second. Since j < 1; comparing the utilities
of the shares generated by sj and s
0
j, we have u
d
j (si; s

j) = CEAj (si; cj; E
1) +
jCEAj (ci   si; 0; E2) = cj > cj   + j  CEAj (si; cj   ; E1)+
jCEAj (ci   si; ; E2) = udj (si; s0j) Hence sj = cj is the dominant strategy
for agent j:
We next claim that si = E
1   cj is the unique best response of agent i
against sj = cj: To see this, rst note that his shares from s

i are CEAi(E
1  
cj; cj; E
1) = E1   cj and CEAi(ci   (E1   cj); 0; E2) = ci   (E1   cj) from
the rst and second periods respectively. Let s0i = s

i    for  2 (0; E1   cj] :
Then his shares from s0i are CEAi(E
1   cj   ; cj; E1) = E1   cj    and
CEAi(ci   (E1   cj) + ; 0; E2)  ci   (E1   cj) +  from the rst and second
periods respectively. Since i < 1; comparing the two we have, udi (s

i ; s

j) =
E1   cj + i(ci   (E1   cj)) > E1   cj   + i(ci   (E1   cj) + )  udi (s0i; sj).
Now let s0i = s

i + : Then his shares are CEAi(E
1   cj + ; cj; E1) = E1   cj
and CEAi(ci   (E1   cj + ); 0; E2) = ci   (E1   cj)  : We have udi (si ; sj) =
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E1   cj + i(ci   (E1   cj)) > E1   cj + i(ci   (E1   cj)  ) = udi (s0i; sj) as
desired.
Case 2: ci; cj > E
1
2
: We have shown that strategies such that
2P
i=1
si < E
1
can not be a Nash Equilibrium. Thus, we restrict our attention to
2P
i=1
si 
E1: Then there exists i 2 N such that si  E12 : Consider j 2 Nni: Let
s0j =
E1
2
+ ,  > 0: Then, since
2P
i=1
ci  E1 + E2; we have
2P
i=1
ci   si  E2
and CEAi(ci   si; cj   sj; E2) = ci   si for each i 2 N: Therefore, udj (si; s0j) =
CEAj(si;
E1
2
+; E1)+jCEAj(ci si; cj  E12  ; E2) = E
1
2
+j(cj  E12  ): On
the other hand, udj (si;
E1
2
) = CEAj(si;
E1
2
; E1)+jCEAj(ci si; cj  E12 ; E2) =
E1
2
+ j(cj   E12 ): Clearly, udj (si; E
1
2
) > udj (si; s
0
j): Now let s
0
j =
E1
2
  : Since
2P
i=1
si  E1 we have 1(s)  E12 and min

s0j; 
1(s)
	
= s0j Then, u
d
j (si; s
0
j) =
CEAj(si;
E1
2
 ; E1)+jCEAj(ci si; cj E12 +; E2) = E
1
2
 +j(cj E12 )+j:
Hence udj (si;
E1
2
) > udj (si; s
0
j): Therefore, s

j =
E1
2
is the unique best response
of agent j that can be in any equilibrium. Now, consider the best response
of agent i against sj =
E1
2
among the strategies such that si  E12 :: We have
udi (s

i ;
E1
2
) = CEAi(
E1
2
; E
1
2
; E1)+iCEAi(ci E12 ; cj E
1
2
; E2) = E
1
2
+i(ci E12 ):
Let s0i =
E1
2
+ : Then, udi (
E1
2
+ ; E
1
2
) = CEAi(
E1
2
+ ; E
1
2
; E1) + iCEAi(ci  
E1
2
  ; cj   E12 ; E2) = E
1
2
+ i(ci  E12 )  i: Then, udi (si ; E
1
2
) > udi (
E1
2
+ ; E
1
2
):
Hence, si = s

j =
E1
2
is the unique equilibrium, as desired.
Proposition 2 Let d = (c; E; ; F ) and Gd =


N;S1; S2; u
d
1; u
d
2

: Assume that
c1 + c2 > E
1 + E2: Then, the following is a Nash Equilibrium: s dened as(
si = s

j =
E1
2
if ci; cj > E
1
2
si = E
1   cj; sj = cj if ci > E
1
2
and cj  E12
: Also, if s is a Nash Equi-
librium, then it creates the same allocation as s, that is, CEA (s; E1) =
CEA (s; E1) and CEA (c  s; E2) = CEA (c  s; E2).
Proof. Case 1) ci; cj > E
1
2
: Let s0i =
E1
2
+: Then we have CEAi(E
1
2
; E
1
2
; E1) =
13
E1
2
and CEAi(E
1
2
+ ; E
1
2
; E1) = E
1
2
then udi (s

i ; s

j) = CEAi(
E1
2
; E
1
2
; E1) +
iCEAi(ci  E12 ; cj  E
1
2
; E2) = E
1
2
+iCEAi(ci  E12 ; cj  E
1
2
; E2)  CEAi(E12 +
; E
1
2
; E1) + iCEAi(ci   E12   ; cj   E
1
2
; E2) = udi (s
0
i; s

j): Conversely, let
s0i =
E1
2
 : Then, CEAi(E12  ; E
1
2
; E1) = E
1
2
 : Thus, udi (s0i; sj) = CEAi(E
1
2
 
; E
1
2
; E1)+iCEAi(ci  E12 +; cj  E
1
2
; E2) = E
1
2
  + iCEAi(ci  E12 +; cj 
E1
2
; E2) < E
1
2
+ iCEAi(ci   E12 + ; cj   E
1
2
; E2)   i  E12 + iCEAi(ci  
E1
2
; cj   E12 ; E2) = udi (si ; sj): From the symmetry of claims (ci; cj > E
1
2
) the
same argument applies for agent j:
For the uniqueness part, we know that in any equilibrium si  E1 for each
i 2 N: In this case, CEAi(si; sj; E1) = CEAj(si; sj; E1) = E12 : Given that
si  E1; since CEAi(ci   si; cj   sj; E2) is a non-decreasing function of sj for
all i 2 N; for each si 2 Si the lowest CEAi(ci si; cj sj; E2) is obtained when
sj =
E1
2
: On the other hand, since CEAi(ci si; cj sj; E2) is a non-increasing
function of si, for each sj 2 Sj; the highest CEAi(ci si; cj sj; E2) is obtained
when si = E
1
2
: As a result, they yield the lowest CEAi(ci   si; cj   sj; E2) in
any equilibrium. Since the same argument holds for agent j and CEAi(ci  
E1
2
; cj   E12 ; E2) +CEAj(ci  E
1
2
; cj   E12 ; E2) = E2, this lowest shares can not
be increased. Thus, the payo¤ vector generated by s is unique.
Case2) ci > E
1
2
and cj  E12 : We are going to show that udj (si; cj) >
udj (si; cj   ); for  2 (0; cj] and for all si 2 Si: Then, we are going to show
that udi (E
1   cj; cj)  udi (si; cj) for all si 2 Si: First we have udj (si; cj) =
CEAj(si; cj; E
1) + jCEAj(ci   si; 0; E2) = cj > cj   + j  CEAj(si; cj  
; E1) +jCEAj(ci   si; ; E2) for  2 (0; cj] for all si 2 Si: Namely, sj = cj is
the dominant strategy of agent j: Now, we will check for agent i0s best response
against this strategy. Playing si , his shares from the rst and the second
periods are CEAi(E1  cj; cj; E1) = E1  cj and CEAi(ci  (E1  cj); 0; E2) =
E2; respectively, since ci   (E1   cj) > E2 by the assumption of the present
proposition. Therefore, udi (E
1   cj; cj) = E1   cj + iE2: Let s0i = E1   cj   
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for  2 (0; E1   cj] : Playing s0i, his shares are CEAi(E1   cj   ; cj; E1) =
E1   cj    and CEAi(ci   (E1   cj   ); 0; E2) = E2 from the rst and the
second periods, respectively. Hence, udi (s
0
i; cj) = E
1   cj    + iE2: Then,
we have udi (E
1   cj; cj) > udi (s0i; cj). Conversely, let s0i = E1   cj +  for
 2 (0; ci   (E1   cj)]. Then his shares are CEAi(E1 cj+ ; cj; E1) = E1 cj
and CEAi(ci  (E1  cj+ ); 0; E2)  E2: Thus, we have udi (s0i; cj)  E1  cj+
iE
2 = udi (E
1   cj; cj): Moreover, since sj is the dominant strategy of agent
j and udi (si; cj) = cj for all si 2 Si, then it is also true in any equilibrium.
As a result, agent i can have all the remaining shares. Hence, s is a Nash
Equilibrium and if s is a Nash Equilibrium, then it creates the same allocation
as s:
3 The N  T Steel Game
Let N = f1; 2; :::; Ng be the set of agents and T = f1; 2; :::; Tg be the set of
periods. For each t 2 T; Et is the social endowment to be allocated among
the agents at period t: Let E = E1 E2 : ET be the vector of endowments
to be divided in periods 1; 2; :::; T , respectively. For each i 2 N; let ci 2 R+
be agent is total claim to be allocated among E:1 Denote c = (c1; c2; :::; cN):
We assume that
P
i2N
ci  max

E1; :::; ET
	
: Each agent prefers shares from Et
over shares from Et+k; where k 2 N+ and t; t + k 2 T: That is, The agents
prefer preceding periods to the succeeding ones. We denote the agent is share
by xi(x1i ; :::; x
T
i ): where x
t
i represents his share from E
t: Agents might have
di¤erent discount factors from each others, however, the discount factor of
an arbitrary agent for di¤erent time periods is xed. Therefore, the utilities
are of the form ui =
TP
t=1
t 1xti: We preserve the denition of a claims problem
1We assume that the number of elements in T is T:
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with time preferences that is given in the 2  2 model. That is, A claims
problem with time preferences is a triple (c; E; ) such that for each t 2 T;
(c; Et) 2ßSTAT is a static claims problem and  is the vector that represents
agentsdiscount factors. We denote the action prole at t by st; agent is
strategy by si and the strategy prole of the whole game by s:
Steel Game: We construct a game where agents simultaneously choose
how much to allocate at each period, observing which strategies are played by
the players of N in the preceding periods. In this game, agent i0s strategy
set is Si = fsi(s1i ; s2i ; :::; sTi ) : 0  sti(s1; s2; :::; st 1)  ci  
t 1P
t=1
sti for each
t 2 f2; 3; :::; Tg and 0  s1i  ci where
P
t2T
sti = cig: Once a player uses some
portion of his total claim at some period, then this portion is subtracted from
the total remaining claim of the agent when determining his action set for the
next period. That is, the claims are perishable.
For each s 2 S; dene t (s) 2 R+ as follows
t (s)
8<: uniquely solves
P
i2N
min

sti; 
t (s)
	
= Et if
P
i2N
sti > E
t
max fst1; st2; :::; stNg if otherwise.
3.1 Equilibria
Theorem 1 Dene s0i = 0: Let d = (c; E; ; F ): Then, the following strategy
prole s is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of
Gd: sti = min

ci   s0i   s1i   :::  st 1i ; ti
	
for t = 1; 2; :::; T   1 and
i = 1; :::; N: We denote t(c1   s01   s11   :::   st 11 ; :::; ci   s0i   s1i   :::  
st 1i ; :::; cN   s0N   s1N   :::  st 1N ) by ti : Moreover, the payo¤s generated by
this prole is unique for all SPNE and if
NP
i=1
ci 
TP
t=1
Et, then s is the unique
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of Gd:
Proof. We rst show that t is non-increasing in claims for
P
i2N
ci  Et: Let
16
P
i2N
ci  Et and let c = (c1; :::; cN), c0 = (c1; :::; ci + ; :::; cN): Assume that
t(c0) > t(c): We have c0i  ci for all i 2 N and, hence,
P
i2N
ci  Et impliesP
i2N
c0i > E
t: Then, there exists k 2 N such that ck > t(c0) because, otherwise,
Et =
P
i2N
Fi(c
0; Et) =
P
i2N
c0i; which is not the case. Also, there exists j such
that cj  t(c) by denition of t(:): Since c0i  ci for all i 2 N and t(c0) >
t(c); we have min

c0i; 
t(c0)
	  minci; t(c)	 for all i 2 N . If cj > t(c);
then min

cj; 
t(c)
	
= t(c) < min

c0j; 
t(c)
	
: Hence,
P
k2N
min

c0k; 
t(c0)
	
>P
k2N
min

ck; 
t(c)
	
= Et. Contradiction. If cj = 
t(c) and there does not
exist any l 2 N such that cl > t(c); then
P
i2N
ci = E
t: This implies that
Fi(c; E
t) = ci for all i 2 N: Then, Fi(c0; Et) = min

ci + ; 
t(c0)
	
> ci =
Fi(c; E
t) for that particular i 2 N: Then, P
i2N
Fi(c
0; Et) =
P
i2N
min

c0i; 
t(c)
	
>P
i2N
min

ci; 
t(c)
	
= Et: Contradiction. Hence, t(c0)  t(c): As a result,
given any st i; 
t
i = min
sti
t(sti; s
t
 i): Then,
min

min

ci   s0i   s1i   :::  st 1i ; ti
	
; ti
	
=
min

ci   s0i   s1i   :::  st 1i ; ti
	
= sti : That is, . Fi(s
t
i ; s i; E
t) = sti
(1)
By a similar argument, we have Fi(sti; s i; E
t) = sti where s
t
i = s
t
i   ;
for some  > 0: Since CEA satises BIT, which is discussed in the next
section, CEAi(ci + ; cj   ; c fi;jg; Et)   CEAi(c; Et)  : Since CEA sat-
ises strong claims monotonicity because of non-increasing t(:); we have
CEAi(ci+; cj; c fi;jg; Et)  CEAi(ci+; cj ; c fi;jg; Et). Hence, CEAi(ci+
; cj; c fi;jg; Et)  CEAi(c; Et)   (2)
>From (1) and (2) we have
P
t2T
F ti (s

i ; s i; E
t) >
P
t2T
F ti (si; s i; E
t) for all
s i 2 S i where si is the strategy consisting of sti ; t 2 T , si includes sti and
F ti (:) is agent i
0s period t share. Therefore, any sti < s
t
i is strictly dominated.
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Considering sums over t 2 fT  K; :::; Tg ; one can see that such strategies
are strictly dominated in any subgame consisting of the last K periods of the
game. Once the strictly dominated strategies are eliminated at each subgame,
the remaining strategies sti are such that for all i 2 N sti  sti ; for all t 2 T
and for each (s1 i; :::; s
t 1
 i ): s
t
i > s
t
i implies 
t(sti ; s i) < s
t
i and 
t(sti ; s i) <
ci  s1i   :::  st 1i That is, sti = t(sti ; s i): Since t(st) = t(st) for st  st;
we have F t(st; Et) = min

st; t(st)
	
= t(st) = t(st) = sti = F
t
i (s
t; Et):
Therefore, any such sti yields the same shares as s
t
i : Then, s
 is a SPNE.
Moreover, if
P
i2N
ci 
P
t2T
Et; the unique such sti is s
t
i for all t 2 T: Hence s is
the unique SPNE for that case. The proof is complete.
4 The Hospital Game
Hospital Game: Similarly, the agents simultaneously decide on how much
to allocate at each period, observing which strategies are played by the players
of N in the preceding periods. Yet, unlike the steel game, the claims are not
always perishable. In the hospital game, to determine the action set of an agent
at some t 2 T; we subtract the shares he received in the preceding periods from
his total claim ci, instead of subtracting the claims he used in the previous
periods. Therefore, the agent is strategy set is Si = fsi(s1i ; s2i ; :::; sTi ) : 0 
sti(s
1; s2; :::; st 1)  ci  
t 1P
t=1
Fi(s
t; Et) for each t 2 f2; :::; Tg and 0  s1i  ci
where
P
t2T
sti = cig:
We adapt the following denition from Thomson (2007):
Denition 3 "Bounded Impact of Transfers" : A rule F (:) satises
"Bounded Impact of Transfers" (BIT hereafter) if for each (c;E t) 2ßSTAT and
each pair fi; jg  N; each c0i > ci and each c0j < cj; if ci + cj = c0i + c0j; then
Fi(c
0
i; c
0
j; cN=fi;jg; E
t) Fi(c; Et)  c0i ci and Fj(c; Et) Fj(c0i; c0j; cN=fi;jg; Et) 
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cj   c0j
By BIT, we consider a static situation where an agent transfers some part
of his claim to some other agent. Under a rule satisfying BIT, the change in
agentsafter-transfer-shares must be less than the transferred amount of claim.
Note that in this denition, checking for BIT involves the transfer between two
agents. However, by lemma 1, we will show that if BIT holds for a rule, then
so does an extended version of it. In other words, even if an agent transfers
some part of his claim to more than one agent, the change in each agents share
will be less than the change in his claim.
Remark 2 We dont impose BIT as a normative criteria. That is to say, we
dont claim that the rules satisfying BIT have a superiority or an inferiority
over the other rules. On the other hand, BIT is satised by a wide range of
rules. We want to show that the strategy prole we dened in theorem 3, is an
equilibrium for a large number of rules. Since requiring BIT and strong claims
monotonicity is enough to prove that theorem and most of the renowned rules
satisfy them, we are able to obtain our results.
Remark 3 It is known that the class of rules that satisfy claims monotonicity
is very large, including PRO, CEA, CEL and TAL. Moreover, the class of
rules that satisfy BIT is also large and contains PRO, CEA, CEL and TAL
as well.
Proposition 3 PRO, CEA, CEL and TAL satisfy BIT
Proof. A somewhat weaker statement of BIT implies the original version of
it. However, it is easier to use the weaker version in some proofs. Then, we
start our proof by showing this relation.
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Assume
P
k2N
ck  Et: Then, coi + c0j +
P
k2Nnfi;jg
ck =
P
k2N
ck  Et where
c0i = ci    and c0j = cj + : Then, any F :ßSTAT ! RN+ with an enlarged
domain to pairs (c; Et) =2ßSTAT satises BIT and the relation that we show
below for any pairs (c; Et); (co; Et) =2ßSTAT : Thus, we show the relation when
(c; Et); (co; Et) 2ßSTAT :
Let (c; Et); (co; Et) 2ßSTAT such that c0i = ci    and c0j = cj +  for
some i; j 2 N and cok = ck for all k 2 Nnfi; jg; for some  > 0: We want to
show that Fj(c0i ; c
0
j ; E
t)   Fj(ci; cj; Et)   for all such (c; Et); (co; Et) ()
Fi(ci; cj; E
t)  Fi(c0i ; c0j ; Et)   for all such (c; Et); (co; Et):
( =) ) Assume Fj(c0i ; c0j ; Et) Fj(ci; cj; Et)   for all such (c; Et); (co; Et):
Let c0i = c
o
i+ and c
0
j = c
o
j  for some i; j 2 N and c0k = c0k for all k 2 Nnfi; jg;
for some  > 0: (That is, (c; Et) = (c0; Et)) Then, we have Fi(c0i; c
0
j; E
t)  
Fi(c
0
i ; c
0
j ; E
t)   by our assumption. Since, c0i = ci and c0j = cj we have
Fi(ci; cj; E
t)  Fi(c0i ; c0j ; Et)   as desired.
Conversely, assume Fi(ci; cj; Et) Fi(c0i ; c0j ; Et)   for all such (c; Et); (co; Et):
Let c0i = c
o
i+ and c
0
j = c
o
j  for some i; j 2 N and c0k = c0k for all k 2 Nnfi; jg;
for some  > 0: Then, we have Fj(c0i ; c
0
j ; E
t)   Fj(c0i; c0j; Et)  .That is,
Fj(c
0
i ; c
0
j ; E
t)   Fj(ci; cj; Et)   for all such (c; Et); (co; Et): As a result, it
is enough to show that one side of this relation is satised by a rule F to show
that it satises BIT as well.
Let (c; Et); (co; Et) 2ßSTAT such that c0i = ci    and c0j = cj +  for some
i; j 2 N and cok = ck for all k 2 Nnfi; jg; for some  > 0; for the following
cases:
PRO: Since
P
k2N
ck =
P
k2N
cok; Fj(c
o; Et)   Fj(c; Et) = E
tcojP
k2N
cok
  EtcjP
k2N
ck
=
EtP
k2N
ck
(coj   cj) = E
tP
k2N
ck
   since EtP
k2N
ck
 1: Hence, PRO satises BIT.
CEA: Let t = t(c; Et) and ot = t(co; Et): There are 2 possible cases:
Case i) ot  t: Fi(co; Et) = min

c0i ; 
ot
	
= min

ci   ; ot
	 
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min

ci   ; t   
	
= Fi(c; E
t)    That is, Along with the relation we
showed above, CEA satises BIT in this case.
Case ii) ot < t: Since we are checking for the case
P
k2N
ck > E
t, there
exists at least one z 2 N such that cz > t: We might have either ci  t or
ci > 
t: Assume ci  t: Then, z 6= i: min

cz; 
ot
	
= ot < t = min

cz; 
t
	
:
Agent js share can increase at most : That is, Fj(co; Et) = min

c0j ; 
ot
	
=
min

cj + ; 
ot
	  mincj + ; t	  mincj; t	+  = Fj(c; Et) + : Hence,
since Fi(co; Et) = min

c0i ; 
ot
	
= min

ci   ; ot
	  minci   ; t   	 =
min

ci; 
t
	  = Fi(c; Et) ; we have P
k2N
Fk(c
o; Et) = Fi(c
o; Et)+Fj(c
o; Et)+
ot+
P
k2Nnfi;j;zg
Fk(c
o; Et) < Fi(c; E
t) +Fj(c; Et)++t+
P
k2Nnfi;j;zg
Fk(c; E
t) =
Et That is, ci  t violates e¢ ciency. Contradiction.
Thus, we must have ci > 
t: We might have either t   ot   or
t   ot > : Assume t   ot > : Fi(co; Et) = min

c0i ; 
ot
	
= ot <
t    = minci; t	    = Fi(c; Et)   : Moreover, as we showed above,
Fj(c
o; Et)  Fj(c; Et) + : Since
P
k2Nnfi;jg
Fk(c
o; Et)  P
k2Nnfi;jg
Fk(c; E
t); we
have
P
k2N
Fk(c
o; Et) = Fi(c
o; Et)+Fj(c
o; Et)+
P
k2Nnfi;jg
Fk(c
o; Et) < Fi(c; E
t) 
 + Fj(c; E
t) +  +
P
k2Nnfi;jg
Fk(c; E
t) =
P
k2N
Fk(c; E
t) = Et That is, t  
ot >  violates e¢ ciency. Hence, we have t   ot  : Then, Fi(co; Et) =
min

c0i ; 
ot
	  minci   ; t   	 = Fi(c; Et)    as desired. Combining
Case i) and Case ii), we have Fi(c; Et)   Fi(co; Et)   for all such
(c; Et); (co; Et). Hence, by using the relation we found above, CEA satises
BIT.
CEL: There are 2 possible cases.
Case i) ot  t: Fj(c; Et)+ = max

cj   t; 0
	
+ = max

cj   t + ; 
	 
max

cj   t + ; 0
	  maxcoj   ot; 0	 = Fj(co; Et):
Case ii) ot < :t Fi(c; Et)   = max

ci   t; 0
	   =
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max

ci   t   ; 
	  maxcoi   ot; 0	 = Fi(co; Et): P
k2Nnfi;jg
Fk(c; E
t) =P
k2Nnfi;jg
max

ck   t; 0
	  P
k2Nnfi;jg
max

cok   ot; 0
	
(1)
Since
P
k2N
Fk(c; E
t) =
P
k2Nnfi;jg
max

ck   t; 0
	
+max

ci   t; 0
	
+
max

cj   t; 0
	
=P
k2Nnfi;jg
max

cok   ot; 0
	
+max

coi   ot; 0
	
+max

coj   ot; 0
	
=P
k2N
Fk(c
o; Et): Together with (1), we havemax

ci   t; 0
	
+max

cj   t; 0
	 
max

coi   ot; 0
	
+max

coj   ot; 0
	
That is, max

ci   t; 0
	 maxcoi   ot; 0	 
max

coj   ot; 0
	 maxcj   t; 0	 (2)
max

ci   t; 0
	    = maxci   t   ; 	  maxcoi   ot; 0	 That is,
  maxci   t; 0	 maxcoi   ot; 0	  maxcoj   ot; 0	 maxcj   t; 0	 =
Fj(c
o; Et)  Fj(c; Et) as desired.
Combining Case i) and Case ii), we have Fj(co; Et)  Fj(c; Et)   for
all such (c; Et); (co; Et): Thus, CEL satises BIT.
TAL: Since
P
k2N
ck =
P
k2N
cok; which part of TAL will be applied before
and after the transfer is xed. Assume
P
k2N
ck
2
 Et: Then, Fk(c; Et) =
min

ck
2
; t
	
= CEAk(
c
2
; Et) for all k 2 N and Fk(co; Et) = min
n
cok
2
; t
o
=
CEAk(
co
2
; Et) for all k 2 N: Hence, Fj(co; Et)   Fj(c; Et) = CEAk( co2 ; Et)  
CEAk(
c
2
; Et)  
2
since CEA satises BIT.
Let
P
k2N
ck
2
< Et: Then, Fj(c; Et) = cj min
 cj
2
; t
	
= max
 cj
2
; cj   t
	
=
cj
2
+ max

0;
cj
2
  t	 : We also have coj
2
=
cj+
2
. Since we are checking for the
case
P
k2N
ck > E
t; we have
P
k2N
Fk(c; E
t) = Et: Then,
P
k2N
( ck
2
+max

0; ck
2
  t	) =
Et;
P
k2N
max

0; ck
2
  t	 = Et   P
k2N
ck
2
: Hence, cj
2
+ max

0;
cj
2
  t	 = cj
2
+
CELj(
c
2
; Et P
k2N
ck
2
), Fj(co; Et) Fj(c; Et) = c
o
j
2
  cj
2
+CELj(
co
2
; Et P
k2N
cok
2
) 
CELj(
c
2
; Et  P
k2N
ck
2
)  
2
+ 
2
= ; since CEL satises BIT. Since in both cases
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of TAL, we showed that the required condition for agent j is satised for all
such (c; Et); (co; Et), the required condition for agent i is also satised for all
such (c; Et); (co; Et): Hence, TAL satises BIT.
The following denitions are from Thomson, (2003):
Denition 4 (Weak Claims Monotonicity): A rule F (:) satises weak
claims monotonicity if for each (c;E t) 2ßSTAT ; each i 2 N , and each c0i > ci;
we have Fi(c0i; c i; E
t)  Fi(c; Et): A rule F (:) is said to be strongly claims
monotonic if it is weakly claims monotonic and for each (c;E t) 2ßSTAT ;
each i 2 N , and each c0i > ci; we have F i(c0i; c i; Et)  F i(c; Et) for each
 i 2 Nn fig :
Next, we will present an example to show that we can not make a conclusion
using only claims monotonicity, but not BIT.
Example 3 Consider the rule F dened by the following algorithm: Let K1 =
fk 2 N such that ck = max fc1; c2; :::; cNgg : If
P
k2K1
ck  Et, then Fk(c; Et) =
Et
K1
2: If
P
k2K1
ck < E
t, then Fk(c; Et) = ck and for
K2 = fz 2 NnK1 such that cz = maxNnK1g if
P
z2NnK1
cz  Et; Fz(c; Et) =
Et  P
k2K1
Fk(c;E
t)
K2
and if otherwise, F proceeds the same way until the entire en-
dowment is allocated or there is no claim left. Since nobody can lose his priority
ranking, (i.e., to which Kt he belongs) by increasing his claim, F is strongly
claims monotonic. Nevertheless, it is easy to check that F does not satisfy
BIT by considering the following case: c1 = 90; c2 = 80; co1 = 80; c
o
2 = 90;
Et = 100: One can see that our equilibrium prole is not an equilibrium for F
under at least some parameters by checking the following example: Let c1 = 90;
c2 = 80; 1 = 0:9; E
1 = 55; E2 = 60; E3 = 55: Assume agent 2 plays 80 at
2We assume that number of elements in Kt is Kt
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t = 1 and then, his entire remaining claim at each period. Against this strat-
egy, if agent 1 plays 90 at t = 1 and then, his entire remaining claim at each
period, he gets: u1(90; :) = 83:35: Instead, if he plays 80 at t = 1 and then,
his entire remaining claim at each period, he gets: u1(80; :) = 83:525 > 83:35:
Therefore, the strategy prole we specied as equilibrium is no more so in this
example.
Theorem 2 Let Gd be a 2  2 hospital game. Assume c1 + c2  E1 + E2:
Then, if F is claims monotonic, then the prole s such that si = ci for all
i 2 N is an equilibrium of Gd and, moreover, if s is an equilibrium of Gd then
it generates the same payo¤s as s: Assume c1 + c2 > E1 + E2: Then, if F
satises claims monotonicity and BIT, then the prole s such that si = ci for
all i 2 N is an equilibrium of Gd and, moreover, if s is an equilibrium of Gd
then it generates the same payo¤s as s:
Proof. We denote x1i = Fi(si; sj; E
1); xo1i = Fi(s
o
i ; sj; E
1); x1i = Fi(s

i ; sj; E
1);
x2i = Fi(ci   Fi(si; sj; E1); cj   Fj(si; sj; E1); E2) and so on. We rst show
that ,given c1+ c2 > E1+E2, at equilibrium s1+ s2 < E1 is not possible. The
same argument also applies when c1+c2  E1+E2; however, we dont use that
in our proof. Given s1+s2 < E1 there exists an agent i with si < ci: Otherwise,
we would have ci + cj < E1 which is contradictory to our assumption. With
the same sj; consider a prole such that soi + sj = E
1 or (soi + sj < E
1 and
soi = ci): If the latter is true, then since its the highest possible utility with
parameter ci; soi = ci is a best response of agent i: Assume s
o
i + sj = E
1. Let
soi   si = : Then, soi = xo1i and si = x1i ; hence (ci   x1i )   (ci   xo1i ) = :
If (cj   x1j)   (cj   x1j ) =   then by BIT, x2i   x2i  : Furthermore, we
have (cj x1j) = (cj xo1j ): By claims monotonicity, we have xo2i  x2i : Hence,
x2i  xo2i  ::We also have xo1i  x1i = : Therefore, xo1i +ixo2i > x1i +ix2i That
is, agent i has an incentive to deviate. The same argument applies for agent j
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when si = ci and si + sj < E1: Hence, at equilibrium, we have s1 + s2  E1:
Case i) c1 + c2  E1 + E2: By our assumption on F , x1i + x2i  ci for
all s 2 S: Consider si = ci and some sj 2 Sj. If ci + sj  E1; then x1i = ci;
which gives the highest possible utility with parameter ci: If si+sj > E1 then,
x1i+x
1
j = E
1: Together with ci+cj  E1+E2; we have (ci x1i )+(cj x1j)  E2:
Thus, x2i = (ci x1i ) and x2j = (cj x1j) That is, x1i +x2i = ci for i 2 N: Consider
soi < si: By claims monotonicity, x
o1
i  x1i : If xo1i = x1i ; then uoi = ui: Assume
xo1i < x
1
i and x
1
i   xo1i = : Since xo1i + xo2i  ci; we have xo2i   x2i  : Then,
ui   uoi = (x1i   xo1i ) + i(x2i   xo2i )    i > 0: Hence, si = ci is the weakly
dominant strategy for both players. Thus, s such that si = ci for all i 2 N is
an equilibrium and at any equilibrium s we have the same payo¤s as that of
s0s:
Case ii) Again, consider si = ci and some sj 2 Sj: If ci + sj  E1;
then x1i = ci; which gives the highest possible utility with parameter ci: Let
si + sj > E
1: Then, we have x1i + x
1
j = E
1: Consider any soi 2 Si such that
soi < si = ci: By claims monotonicity, x
o1
i  x1i : If xo1i = x1i ; then uoi = ui:
Assume xo1i < x
1
i and x
1
i  xo1i = :We have already shown that if soi +sj < E1
then agent i has an incentive to deviate and increase soi until s
o
i + sj = E
1 is
satised. Let soi+sj  E1: Again, xo1i +x1j = E1: Therefore, xo1j  x1j = : Then,
(ci x1i )  (ci xo1i ) =   and (cj  x1j)  (cj  xo1j ) = : By BIT, xo2i  x2i  :
ui   uoi = (x1i   xo1i ) + i(x2i   xo2i )     i > 0 since i < 1: Hence, si = ci
is the weakly dominant strategy of agent i: Since the same argument applies
for agent j; the payo¤s of s is unique at any equilibrium s: Thus, the proof is
complete.
Theorem 3 (N  T Hospital Model) Let Gd be an N  T hospital game.
Then, if F is strongly claims monotonic and satises BIT, the strategy prole
s such that s1k = ck; s
2
k = ck   Fk(c; E1); s3k = ck   Fk(c; E1)   Fk(c  
Fk(c; E
1); E2);..., sNk = ck   Fk(c; E1)   :::   Fk(c   F (c; E1)   :::   F (c  
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F (c; E1) ::: F (:::); EN): (That is, each agent k 2 N uses his entire remaining
claim at each of the periods) is a SPNE and any SPNE s generates the same
payo¤s as s:
Werst prove that BIT implies an extended version of itself by the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Let (c; Et); (co; Et) 2ßSTAT : BIT implies that the following state-
ment is true: Let c0i = ci   ; cok = ck + k for k 2 Nn fig where
P
k2Nnfig
k = :
Then, we have Fi(c; Et) Fi(co; Et)   and Fk(co; Et) Fk(c; Et)  k for all
k 2 Nn fig :
Proof. Dene 0 = 0:We have Fi(c1+1;c2+2; :::; ck+k; :::; ci 
kP
j=0
j; :::; cN) 
Fi(c1 + 1;:::; ck+1 + k+1; :::; ci  
k+1P
j=0
j; :::; cN)  k+1 for k = f0; 1; :::; N   1g
by BIT. Then we have,
N 1P
k=0
Fi(c1+ 1;c2+ 2; :::; ck + k; :::; ci 
kP
j=0
j; :::; cN) 
Fi(c1 + 1;:::; ck+1 + k+1; :::; ci  
k+1P
j=0
j; :::; cN) =
= Fi(c; E
t) Fi(c1+ 1;:::; ci 
NP
j=1
j; :::; cN + N) 
NP
j=1
j =  as desired.
Now, we are checking for the rst group of subgames of the hospital game,
namely for the last two periods.
Lemma 2 (N2 Equilibrium) For a N2 hospital game, the strategy prole
s such that sk = ck for each k 2 N is a Nash equilibrium and any Nash
equilibrium s yields the same payo¤s as s:
Proof. By claims monotonicity, all the remaining claims are used in the last
period. As a consequence, we can write the strategies as a function of only the
rst periods claims so that we dont use superscripts for notational simplicity.
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Consider any Fk(ck; s k; E1)   Fk(sk; s k; E1) =  > 0 for some s k 2 S k:P
 k2Nnfkg
F k(sk; s k; E1)   F k(ck; s k; E1) =
P
 k2Nnfkg
 k = . Hence, (ck  
Fk(sk; s k; E1))   (ck   Fk(ck; s k; E1)) =  and (c k   F k(ck; s k; E1))  
(c k F k(sk; s k; E1)) =  k for all k 2 Nn fkg : From BIT we have Fk((ck 
Fk(sk; s k; E1)); (c k F k(sk; s k; E1)); E2) Fk((ck Fk(ck; s k; E1)); (c k 
F k(ck; s k; E1)); E2)  
Hence, Fk(ck; s k; E1)+kFk((ck Fk(ck; s k; E1)); (c k F k(ck; s k; E1)); E2)
> Fk(sk; s k; E1)+kFk((ck Fk(sk; s k; E1)); (c k F k(sk; s k; E1)); E2)
for all s k 2 S k: Hence, sk = ck is a weakly dominant strategy for agent k:
Since this is true for all k 2 N; we have the desired result.
Proof. (of the theorem 3 )We have proved our claimed for T = 2 by the above
lemma. Now, we are going to prove it for arbitrary T , by assuming it for T 1:
Notice that by this assumption, we can write the strategies as a function of
only the actions in the rst period. We denote Fk(sk; s k; Et) = xtk(sk; s k)
and Fk(ck; s k; Et) = xtk(ck; s k) for k 2 N and t 2 T: Let sk < ck be such that
x1k(ck; s k)  x1k(sk; s k) =  > 0 for some s k 2 S k and for some k 2 N: By
strong claims monotonicity we have x1 k(sk; s k)  x1 k(ck; s k) =  k for each
 k 2 Nn fkg where P
 k2Nnfkg
 k = : Here, by stk(sk; s k) for t = f2; :::; Tg we
denote the SPNE of the subgames where each agent uses his entire remaining
claim at each of the remaining periods after playing (sk; s k) at t = 1:
s2 k(ck; s k)   s2 k(sk; s k) =  k and s2k(sk; s k)   s2k(ck; s k) = : Denote
x2k(sk; s k)   x2k(ck; s k) =  2k and x2 k(ck; s k)   x2 k(sk; s k) =  2 k: 3From
BIT, we have  2 k   k and  2k  : From e¢ ciency and claims boundedness,P
 k2Nnfkg
x2 k(ck; s k) + x
2
k(ck; s k) =
P
 k2Nnfkg
x2 k(sk; s k) + x
2
k(sk; s k) That
is,
P
 k2Nnfkg
 2 k =  
2
k
3 2 k and  
2
k are functions of (sk; s k). However, since we xed a strategy prole begining
with (sk; s k); we wont write this each time for simplicity.
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We then have s3 k(ck; s k)   s3 k(sk; s k) =  k    2 k and s3k(sk; s k)  
s3k(ck; s k) =    2k:
 3 k = x
3
 k(ck; s k) x3 k(sk; s k)   k  2 k,  3k = x3k(sk; s k) x3k(ck; s k) 
   2k and
s4 k(ck; s k) s4 k(sk; s k) =  k  2 k  3 k and s4k(sk; s k) s4k(ck; s k) =
  2k  3k; proceeding the same way we have,  Tk = xTk (sk; s k) xTk (ck; s k)
and  T k = x
T
 k(ck; s k)   xT k(sk; s k); then  Tk      2k    3k   :::    T 1k
That is,  
TP
t=2
 tk: Therefore, since k < 1;
TP
t=1
xtk(ck; s k) 
TP
t=1
xtk(sk; s k) >
TP
t=1
t 1k x
t
k(sk; s k) as desired. As a result, using the entire available claim
at each period of each subgame is a weakly dominant strategy. Therefore,
everyone playing s is a SPNE and every SPNE s must generate the same
payo¤s. Thus, the proof is complete.
5 Conclusion
Both for the steel and the hospital games, we have showed that if the agents are
impatient, that is, ., they care more for the previous periods, then they tend
to claim higher at those periods as long as claiming higher generates returns.
This is also a consequence of the fact that the extra returns and the extra
perished claims are at the same amount in our models. We found to what
extend claiming higher generates returns in the steel game. For the hospital
game, we have showed that, since the agents dont lose the claims for which
they dont receive shares in return, each uses his entire (remaining) claim at
each period. Note that this is also due to the fact that decreasing the share
at some period, dont yield a higher share in the succeeding periods. (BIT)
Fortunately, the class of rules that satisfy strong claims monotonicity and BIT
is very large and our analysis includes them.
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One can further inquire whether there is any possibility for cooperation.
First note that there is a basis for cooperation only if the prole of utilities at
the cooperation strategies satises some two conditions. The rst one requires
the existence of an agent who benets from this cooperation. The second
condition says that no player in the cooperation should end up with a utility
less than the utility he receives if he doesnt cooperate. Notice that these two
conditions together form the weakest requirement for such a cooperation. If
one of these conditions does not hold, then either one agent gets worse-o¤ or
each cooperating agent gets the same utility he gets in the non-cooperating
equilibrium. As a result, there is no cooperation at the absence of a such
a utility prole. For a dynamic situation with two agents and two periods,
Turhan (2009) has showed that given that the discount factors of the agents are
not equal to each other and at each period each agent has a claim less or equal
to the endowment of that period, an allocation is Pareto optimal if and only
if the agent with the lower discount factor receives his entire claim at the rst
period and the other agent receives his at the second period. This is, however,
not the case in many equilibria of our games. For instance consider the 2 2
Hospital Game under CEA where (c1; c2; E1; E2) = (100; 100; 100; 100): In any
equilibrium of the game, we have (x11; x
2
1; x
1
2; x
2
2) = (50; 50; 50; 50): Given that
1 = 0:8 and 2 = 0:4; the allocation (70; 20; 30; 80) Pareto dominates the
allocation (50; 50; 50; 50): In addition, we know that in the equilibria of the
games we constructed, the payo¤s are unique. Therefore, at the absence of
binding agreements, any cooperation is not sustainable. On the other hand, if
there are binding agreements to sustain such a cooperation, then the strategy
proles they involve are not SPNE.
Secondly, it is natural to ask whether a central authority, say government,
can achieve a Pareto optimal outcome as an equilibrium of the Hospital Game,
if he is able to change the allocation rule at each period. In such a setting,
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the agents either know which rule will be used at each period certainly before
the game starts or the government chooses the rule at each period without
informing the agents. As a third alternative, at each period the government
might announce only that periods rule before the agents choose their strate-
gies. If the government doesnt inform the agents before the game starts, at
each period he can either choose the rule with observing the agentsclaims for
that period or without observing them. However, in each of these settings, if
we assume that the government chooses the rule among a set of rules satisfying
BIT and strong claims monotonicity, then our results are still valid. That is,
the government can not create a Pareto dominating outcome. As a matter of
fact, most of the rules satisfying some "desirable" properties also satisfy BIT
and strong claims monotonicity. As a consequence, the governments choices
wont change the agentsbehavior in equilibrium.
Finally, another open question is how the government would behave if he
could determine the endowment at each period given the total endowment
to be allocated among the periods. For a government caring for the agents
utilities, we expect him to allocate the entire endowment to the rst period
because we assume that all agents prefer the rst period over the others.
There are instances where
P
i2N
ci 
T 1P
t=1
Et: In those cases some of the
periods at the end are idle. In other words, it is obvious that in any equilibrium
there wont be any claim in those periods. Our analysis is valid for such games
as well.
As a future research question, one can extend the preferences to single-
peaked ones which are also very common in the literature. Another interesting
open question involves the equilibrium if there are multi-issue endowments at
the periods. That is, agents might receive shares from di¤erent endowments
at the same period. Its interesting to ask under what conditions agents tend
to claim from the same endowment and under what conditions they rather
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prefer di¤erent endowments
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